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Resumen 
Se discute que, dado que el conocimiento es abstrac-
to y que cada persona tiene una percepción única de 
su entorno y de las propiedades y comportamiento de 
sus componentes, se debe colegir que las personas 
comprometidas en la representación y organización 
del conocimiento deben basar su trabajo en los regis-
tros físicos, a los cuales podemos denominar trans-
portadores de información o mensajes. Los productos 
basados en el análisis de estos mensajes pueden por 
consiguiente ser considerados modelos del conoci-
miento. Estos modelos son creados para reducir la 
complejidad y ganar una comprensión más clara de 
los aspectos del mundo que nos rodea, pero deben 
ser continuamente comprobados y revisados en un 
entorno de trabajo. La evaluación de los productos 
del conocimiento se realiza frecuentemete por los 
científicos de la información en el proceso de asegu-
rar la recuperación de la información, mientras que 
los productos de representación del conocimiento 
también se apoyan en la organización del conoci-
miento, que puede ser entendida, hasta cierto punto, 
como auto-evaluada. Se sigue que se podría ganar 
mucho de una colaboración más estrecha entre los 
que trabajan en los campos de la representación del 
conocimiento, de la organización del conocimiento y 
lo que están implicados en la provisión de informa-
ción a los usuarios. 
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It is argued that because knowledge is abstract and 
every person has a unique perception of his environ-
ment and the properties and behaviour of its compo-
nents, it follows that those people engaged in 
Knowledge Organization and Knowledge Representa-
tion must base their work on physical records, which 
we may call carriers of information, or messages. The 
products based on analysis of these messages can 
then be considered as models of knowledge. Models 
are created in order to reduce complexity and to gain 
a clearer understanding of aspects of the world 
around us, but they must be continuously tested and 
revised in a working environment. The testing of the 
products of Knowledge Organization is often carried 
out by information scientists in their provision of in-
formation retrieval, whereas while the products of 
Knowledge Representation also rely on Knowledge 
Organization, they may be considered, to some ex-
tent, to be self-testing. It follows that much can be 
gained by a closer collaboration between those en-
gaged in Knowledge Organization, Knowledge Rep-
resentation and those engaged in delivering infor-
mation to end users. 
Keywords: Knowledge representation. Knowledge 
organization. Information retrieval. Interdisciplinarity. 
Evaluation. 
 
1.  Foreword 
Let me start by stating that what follows is a 
personal view, coloured by the fact that I am a 
professional consultant, rather than an acade-
mic; and that, while I am a member of the Exe-
cutive committee of ISKO(UK) my views do not 
necessarily represent the views of my Commit-
tee colleagues. 
2.  Introduction 
The etymology of work in the Library and Infor-
mation Sciences has often been poor and po-
tentially misleading, and this etymology is ten-
ding to get more confused as others make their 
contributions to the increasingly wide and com-
plex arena of “information processing”. For 
example, before full text retrieval became possi-
ble, the neologism ‘information retrieval’ should 
more accurately have been called ‘reference 
retrieval’; and the term ‘information scientist’, 
coined in the UK meaning ‘a scientist employed 
to provide information to other scientists’ gave 
rise to the term ‘Information Science’ which, in 
those early days, was a somewhat presum-
ptuous claim.  
Today, with librarians, information scientists, 
website designers, knowledge engineers and 
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others all engaged in aspects of information 
processing, it is often difficult to know what is 
meant by such words as ‘facet’, ‘taxonomy’ or 
‘ontology’ and above all to one of the most over-
loaded words ‘knowledge’, which we find in the 
compound terms ‘Knowledge Management’ 
(KM), ‘Knowledge Organization’ (KO). ‘Kno-
wledge Representation’ (KR), ‘Knowledge Engi-
neer’ (which seems to have replaced the term 
‘Artificial Intelligence’), and even ‘Knowledge 
worker’. So let us take a closer look at this key 
word ‘Knowledge’. 
3.  Knowledge 
The study of Knowledge per se is Epistemology: 
“the theory or science of the method or grounds 
of knowledge” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2011).  
As such, it seems to be mainly concerned with 
such questions as “What does it mean ‘to 
know’”; and what can we mean by the terms 
‘scientific knowledge’ or ‘religious knowledge’; or 
are there limits to what we can know. This leads 
to the thought that doubt must come after kno-
wledge, which is elaborated in the concept ca-
lled “fallibilism”, defined as “the philosophical 
principle that human beings could be wrong 
about their beliefs, expectations, or their un-
derstanding of the world”, and that “any claim 
justified today may need to be revised or 
withdrawn in light of new evidence, new argu-
ments, and new experiences” (Wikipedia contri-
butors, 2011).  
The physicist Lawrence Krauss has been quoted 
as saying: “Uncertainty is a central component 
of what makes science successful”. This cons-
tant state of flux concerning what we think we 
know forces us to consider what we can mean 
by the word knowledge in a practical and every 
day sense; and the only way we, in the LIS pro-
fessions, can deal with it is to recognize that 
knowledge is held in the individual brain —and 
that shared knowledge is a consensus (inevita-
bly a compromise) of shared perceptions.  
It follows that, strictly speaking, KM is an impos-
sibility, and that we must also be careful what 
we mean by KO. Knowledge is shared either 
orally (and this is where KM attempts to facilitate 
such transfer); or through written records (which 
is the domain of LIS). 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) have convincingly 
made this distinction in their book “The kno-
wledge creating company” in which they descri-
be “tacit knowledge” as that which is stored in 
the brain and “explicit knowledge” as that which 
is recorded, (which we may fairly call ‘informa-
tion’). They also, in what has become known as 
the SECI Model, show the four transformations 
between tacit and explicit knowledge: 
• Tacit to tacit (socialization): a classical com-
ponent of KM 
• Tacit to explicit (externalization): transfer of 
knowledge from minds to formal records 
• Explicit to explicit (combination): creation of 
new records through collation 
• Explicit to tacit (internalization): assimilation 
of knowledge from records. 
Though it has just been claimed that we can 
consider explicit knowledge to be the same as 
information in the normal sense of the word, we 
should continue to be careful with our choice of 
words and remember that one ‘item’ of informa-
tion assimilated by one person does not have 
exactly the same meaning as it might have for 
another.  
We might, then, argue that the term ‘Information 
Management’ is also misleading; and, indeed, 
Miller (2002) has argued that “information has 
no intrinsic meaning”, distinguishing between 
meaning and ‘messages’, or in the terms above 
explicit knowledge as records or (in their widest 
sense) documents.  
Not only may interpretations vary according to 
the different mental ‘knowledge stores’ of the 
two individuals, but context and use also come 
into play, and as Myers and Myers (1998) say  
...words don’t have meanings. There is no direct re-
lationship between the thing you are talking about 
and the words you use. Only as these words are 
related through the thoughts of a person do they 
have meaning. Meaning is not in the object or in 
the symbol but in the interaction of these through 
the human [communication process].  
(It may be observed here, in passing, that the 
word knowledge has acquired a rather grander 
sound than the humbler and more prosaic word 
information - which is why some vendors of re-
trieval software erroneously claim to be selling 
knowledge retrieval). 
4.  Information 
If, then, we should consider that our only ap-
proach to knowledge is through the recorded 
message there are some important implications.  
First, that messages are issued about very many 
and diverse sorts of information. So, in principle, 
exponents of KO and IS should be concerned 
with facilitating access to records of ‘many and 
diverse sorts of information’, and should be pre-
pared to process all messages where there is a 
demand for such messages to be retrieved.  
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Second, it is not for us to dictate what are good 
or bad messages (though we may well have 
informed opinions about them). Floridi (2010) 
has proposed a tree structure of information 
concepts which includes “untrue information”, 
which can be either misinformation (unintentio-
nal) or disinformation (intentional). Librarians 
and information scientists process messages to 
facilitate their retrieval, and only indirectly to 
provide access to knowledge, and consequently 
are bound to deal with ‘untrue information” as 
well as “true information”. When does true in-
formation become untrue —and vice versa? Are 
we not concerned, for example, with the history 
of science and what arguments were once put 
forward for geocentrism? Are we not obliged to 
record the latest findings from bioarchaeological 
evidence correcting earlier notions of Homo 
Sapiens, Neanderthal Man and their interaction? 
We know that Beijing was once called Peking 
and that Slovenia was part of Jugoslavia, but we 
must update our maps and gazeteers, while 
maintaining the previous names for the records.  
The third point arising from the obligation to deal 
with messages is that, if we accept KO to be 
largely about the semantics of Structured Voca-
bularies (SV) (1) and IS to be about the delivery 
of information, then it is suggested that there is 
an increasingly large overlap between the two 
activities, which implication will be discussed 
later in this paper. 
5.  Models 
Returning to the concept of fallibilism, defined 
earlier, we may acknowledge that the only way 
to rise above the tricky ground of knowledge, 
information and meaning is to think in terms of 
‘approximations’.  
Neil Gershenfeld, another American physicist, 
has been quoted as saying that “the most com-
mon misunderstanding about science is that 
scientists seek and find truth. They don’t —they 
make and test models”.  
Are not all ‘mentefacts’ (2) in some sense mo-
dels? And if this is true, then our SVs can also 
be considered as models ‘approximating’ to the 
contents for which they are designed.  
Some support for this view may be found in the 
concept of ‘pragmatic epistemology’ enunciated 
by Heylighen (1993), who says:  
This philosophy still dominates most present work 
in cognitive science and artificial intelligence. Ac-
cording to pragmatic epistemology, knowledge 
consists of models that attempt to represent the 
environment in such a way as to maximally simplify 
problem-solving. 
Is this not what we do when we construct a mo-
del that we call a structured vocabulary? And is 
this structured vocabulary not a compilation of 
words without meanings until they are used in 
indexing (tagging) to support an aspect of pro-
blem-solving? 
Though this point is not central to the argument 
in this paper, it could be argued that we (whet-
her working in the areas of KO or IS) must no 
longer be concerned only with the models of SV 
which, incidentally, have called on, for example 
General Systems Theory and the Theory of 
Integrative Levels in the approach to building 
bibliographic classifications.  
We must now concern ourselves more tho-
roughly with such models as semantic maps as 
used in ontologies, as well as models that we 
might use in that part of IS called information 
architecture, such as enterprise architecture 
models and domain models used to describe the 
environments in which information retrieval ope-
rates. 
 We should also be conversant with modelling 
techniques such as mind maps and the Unified 
Modelling Language, which has been used to 
model a complete set of the components of a 
thesaurus and their relationships to each other. 
In essence, KO is about the analysis of explicit 
knowledge, just as information architecture is 
largely about the analysis of the environments in 
which the products of KO are deployed. Furt-
hermore, such analysis may not be confined to 
the support of conventional information retrieval 
which has expanded in recent years as electro-
nic information becomes more manipulable.  
This expansion was well illustrated in a number 
of interesting papers given at the second Bien-
nial Conference of ISKO(UK) last July. In parti-
cular Campbell (in press) showed how applica-
tion of Farradane’s relational indexing to parallel 
texts in the languages of health professionals 
and lay writers discovered significant, but not 
immediately recognizable, ambiguities between 
the two texts.  
In another paper, Lambe (in press) argued that 
in the current complex state of scientific re-
search, involving multidisciplinary teams, KO 
had a role to play in identifying and recording 
new boundaries and overlaps between appa-
rently disparate subject areas as an aid to sen-
se-making in the pursuit of scientific discovery. 
Finally, Petras proposed that Knowledge Orga-
nization Systems (KOS) could be considered to 
be deployed in seven distinct applications in 
information retrieval systems (in press). 
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6.  Knowledge Representation 
A Knowledge Representation is also a model, 
incorporating a structured vocabulary, but one 
with more features, thereby making it more po-
werful for certain defined operations. This link 
between KR and modelling is well described by 
Davis et al. (1993) who argue that  
Any intelligent entity that wishes to reason about its 
world encounters an important, inescapable fact: 
reasoning is a process that goes on internally, whi-
le most things it wishes to reason about exist only 
externally.  
These authors go on to propose that a KR is 
best described in terms of five fundamental ro-
les: 
(1) a surrogate, a substitute for the thing itself, 
used to enable an entity to determine consequen-
ces by thinking rather than acting. 
(2) a set of ontological commitments, i.e. an 
answer to the question: In what terms should I think 
about the world? 
(3) a fragmentary theory of intelligent reasoning, 
expressed in terms of three components (i) the re-
presentation’s fundamental conception of intelligent 
reasoning; (ii) the set of inferences the representa-
tion sanctions; and (iii) the set of inferences it re-
commends. 
(4) a medium for pragmatically efficient computa-
tion. 
(5) a medium of human expression, i.e. a language 
in which we say things about the world. 
KR, then, has a distinct relationship with KO (or 
can be seen as an applied form of KO). The 
products of both are surrogates using a medium 
of human expression, but KR employs a state-
ment of intent and some formal logic manipula-
ted by an inference engine.  
A major and important difference is that KRs 
work most effectively in relatively closed sys-
tems with specific purposes, such as suggesting 
treatment on the basis of medical diagnoses.  
The challenge for the Semantic Web is to vastly 
extend such logical reasoning and, we should 
note here, to ensure that the underpinning and 
necessary SVs are not only available, but as 
well-formed and maintainable as possible.  
A second difference that leads on from the first is 
that the vocabularies supporting KRs are “spe-
cial” as in the early use of the term to distinguish 
such classification schemes from the larger uni-
versal schemes such as the Dewey Decimal 
Classification.  
A further distinction is that the special and uni-
versal schemes used in ‘bibliographic’ retrieval 
systems are in some sense predictive, espe-
cially where flexibility of co-ordination of con-
cepts is supported by a structure created by 
facet analysis.  
Where the two converge is in the development 
of what we may call an ontology. In KR this is 
the vocabulary component that is manipulated 
by a logic layer such as OWL and mounted on 
the Internet using a language such as RDF.  
This ontology will usually have genus/species 
relationships —designated as Broader Terms 
(BTG)/Narrower Terms (NTG) in thesauri, and 
as ‘isa’ in KR), and whole/part relationships (de-
signated as BTP/NTP in thesauri and ‘is part of’ 
in KR.  
A major difference is that the KR also has Rela-
ted Terms which, unlike most thesauri, are spe-
cifically defined (such as the unidirectional the-
saural RT between Irbesartan and Hypertension 
which can be designated in a KR as the bidirec-
tional relationship ‘is used to treat’/’treated by’).  
However, with currently available software it is 
now possible to create thesauri for information 
retrieval applications incorporating not only defi-
ned hierarchies and relationships but to add 
notes and sortable codes to each term. These 
‘enriched’ thesauri, sometimes called ontologies, 
can be extended to perform as terminology re-
positories to facilitate interoperability within, and 
even between, organizations. (Note, however, 
that closely defined RTs may be mostly specific 
to an organization or application, because whe-
reas hierarchies must be either generic/specific, 
whole/part or instantial (and even here they may 
be further defined) thesaurus standards do not 
list universal RT types, other than as guidelines 
drawn from facet analysis). 
7.  Testing models 
Mention was made earlier of ‘pragmatic episte-
mology’, which must be an offshoot of a branch 
of philosophy called ‘Pragmatism’ which, propo-
sed by the American philosopher Charles San-
ders Peirce and elaborated by his compatriots 
William James and John Dewey, is defined as 
“A method of understanding facts and events in 
terms of cause and effect, and of inferring prac-
tical lessons or conclusions from this process” 
(Oxford English Dictionary, 2011).  
The testing of models created by KO for KR, 
KOS and information retrieval must, to a large 
extent be pragmatic: a process of inference 
rather than reliance on circumstantial detail. 
There are many more types of models than tho-
se discussed above, but all share the property of 
being representations of complexity so that we 
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can better understand and deal with the world 
around us.  
But, because they are approximations and be-
cause the things that we model are constantly 
changing, we must also continuously test our 
models and revise them so as to maintain some 
understanding of our world.  
Scientists are constantly testing models and 
challenging hypotheses (just think about the 
amazing discoveries and hypotheses emanating 
from the experiments in the Large Hadron Colli-
der on an almost daily basis) and subsequently 
describing these models and hypotheses in the 
learned journals. Their papers may then be 
analysed and indexed by information scientists, 
using semantic models devised by ‘Knowledge 
Organizers’, and here we arrive at an important 
point.  
The models that we call SVs must, like all mo-
dels, be tested; and the only practical way in 
which they can be tested is in their application, 
that is to say through their efficacy in relating to 
the written records for which they are designed. 
It is not too fanciful to suggest that such testing 
is an aspect of ‘applied epistemology’, defined 
as (MacGraw…, 2003): 
The use of machines or other models to simulate 
processes such as perception, recognition, lear-
ning, and selective recall, or the application of prin-
ciples assumed to hold for human categorization, 
perception, storage, search, and so on, to the de-
sign of machines, machine programs, scanning, 
storage, and retrieval systems. 
So we may now say that KO has, like many 
other disciplines, a pure and an applied compo-
nent; the former being concerned with the theory 
and techniques of KO, the latter with the appli-
cation of the complete mentefacts such as SVs.  
This indicates, not surprisingly, that there is a 
large overlap between the interests and activi-
ties of the two communities of KO and IS, and 
one which, perhaps, is likely to become more 
pronounced.  
There has been mention in this paper, for con-
venience, of the words indexing and tagging 
without further elaboration; but in an environ-
ment of distributed processing and full-text re-
trieval these words are now used more loosely 
and tagging is not confined to specialists.  
At the same time, information scientists are in-
creasingly directly involved with the creation of 
‘special’ SVs and interoperability between them. 
In other words they have become more concer-
ned with KO at the application level, while other 
information scientists continue to help maintain, 
develop and map the big schemes such as De-
wey, MeSH and EUROVOC. 
8.  Conclusions 
In recognizing that knowledge is an abstract 
entity confined to the individual human brain, the 
proponents of KO and IS must both work prag-
matically, albeit that they work with concepts. 
But even here they must remember that con-
cepts are also abstract and that words have no 
intrinsic meaning.  
Information is also abstract and information 
scientists must work with ‘messages’ which are 
the attempts of knowledge creators to dissemi-
nate their opinions.  
According to the SECI model knowledge crea-
tors record their ideas as explicit knowledge 
(Externalisation) which are then analysed by IS 
(Internalisation) so that they can ‘describe’ them 
by processes such as abstracting and indexing 
(a sort of Combination), making these new pro-
ducts available for intelligent information re-
trieval. And so the cycle continues with users 
reading the retrieved documents (Internalization) 
and creating new messages, sharing these with 
others in discussion or giving papers at confe-
rences (Socialization) and recording them (Ex-
ternalization).  
The eminent information scientist Robert Fairt-
horne once said “It is not the job of information 
scientists to give information, but information 
about information”. One might add that it is not 
the job of those concerned with KO to give kno-
wledge, but information about knowledge; and 
this is achieved through the construction of mo-
dels.  
Throughout these various information chains 
models are being continuously created and 
pragmatically tested, from which it follows that 
the efforts of those working in KO, KR and IS 
overlap to such an important degree that they 
should work closely together. Unfortunately, 
present institutional and educational structures 
are not providing effective support for such co-
llaboration. 
9.  Postscript 
ISKO(UK) was established in February 2007, 
and so is a relatively new Chapter of ISKO. Its 
objectives are “to promote research and com-
munication in the domain of knowledge organi-
zation, within the broad field of information 
science and related disciplines”, and “to seek to 
establish links with all groups and fora in the UK 
involved in information and knowledge organiza-
tion”.  
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In its four years it has held 14 afternoon mee-
tings, many attended by up to 100 people, on 
such diverse topics as KO techniques (semantic 
analysis technology, facet analysis); new deve-
lopments (Semantic Web, Linked Data); and 
subject specific events (Legal information, Cultu-
ral Heritage, Records Management). The IS-
KO(UK) website carries accounts of all these 
meetings and, in some cases, audio recordings 
of the talks.  
The biennial two-day Conferences have each 
attracted around 140 delegates, and have been 
addressed by speakers from 18 countries, which 
suggests that our collaborative objectives do, 
and should, extend beyond the UK. 
In recent months some disquiet has been ex-
pressed in the UK about the “fragmentation” of 
the information profession and whether anything 
should be done about it. Fragmentation means 
“the process or state of breaking into small or 
separate parts”.  
Historically, in the UK, there has been a ‘pro-
cess’ of fragmentation of the library and informa-
tion institutions, but the current ‘state’ of frag-
mentation has more to do with the evolution of 
an information-centric world. The UK Library 
Association was established as long ago as 
1877, and in 1924 Aslib (Association of Special 
Libraries and Information Bureaux) was formed 
because some thought that the Library Associa-
tion was paying insufficient attention to the 
needs of the newly emerging industrial and bu-
siness libraries. In the 1950s there was another 
‘break-away’ movement when Jason Farradane 
and others established the Institute of Informa-
tion Scientists and the first School of Information 
Science in the world, believing that information 
science was a distinct academic subject.  
In 2002, the Institute, suffering from financial 
difficulties, merged with the Library Association 
to form the Chartered Institute of Librarians and 
Information Professionals —an odd title which 
seems to suggest on the one hand that libra-
rians are not information professionals, but on 
the other fails to define what is meant by the 
term information professionals. The merger has 
been less than successful, and so it was not 
perhaps surprising when one of the contributors 
to the ‘fragmentation’ debate observed that IS-
KO(UK) appeared to have filled the gap left by 
the demise of the Institute of Information Scien-
tists. Be that as it may, the fact remains that 
there are many and diverse ‘information profes-
sionals’, however that term may be defined (as 
well as the myriad numbers of ‘information ama-
teurs’ who sit at their PCs authoring, publishing, 
disseminating, storing and retrieving informa-
tion). At this moment in the evolution of the in-
formation-centric world it would be impossible, 
and wrong, to ‘institutionalize’ the disparate ran-
ge of information professionals, but KO and IS 
are too important to ignore the diffusion of ‘in-
formation professionals’.  
In her Presidential address to ISKO, Maria Lo-
pez-Huertas called for the opening up of ISKO 
to all those in any way concerned with KO; and 
also stated that KO should address actual needs 
and so provide a better service to the Informa-
tion Society. There is still much to achieve. 
Notas 
(1) Including, according to the BS and ISO standards, the-
sauri, classifications, taxonomies and ontologies. 
(2) A word coined by the classificationist Barbara Kyle as an 
amalgamation of mental and artefact. 
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